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HYDROELECTRIC RELICENSING PROCESS
DEMONSTRATES ABOUT PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION THEORIES
HEATHER PAYNE*
“The Catawba-Wateree relicensing project has been perhaps
the largest, most extensive public involvement project ever
undertaken in this river basin. . . . Stakeholder hours
invested in meetings: 58,000.” Application for New License
regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project1
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I. INTRODUCTION
There aren’t many ways for the average citizen to become
involved in energy regulation.2 Citizens have little input into any
utility docket process; moreover, because the process is so difficult
for the average citizen to understand, there is little oversight
provided by the public in regular, everyday utility matters.3
However, one place where citizens have become more involved in
regulatory matters is in dockets before the federal government,
specifically nuclear and hydroelectric relicensing proceedings.4
2. Citizens do not feel like they have much input; the majority of their utilities are
monopolies. For the utility dockets that affect citizens the most by changing their bills through
rate cases, riders and the like, they find out about changes after the fact through a mailer in
their monthly bill. As a commentator in the New York Times put it recently: “Unfortunately,
in most markets around the country, electricity is still one of the few areas where we have
virtually no choice over our supplier. Imagine you want to buy a G.M. car, but you were told
you can buy only a Toyota. You’d be outraged — yet this is how almost all Americans are forced
to procure their electricity.” Ben Ho, The Conservative Case for Solar Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/opinion/the-conservative-case-for-solarsubsidies.html?_r=1. Stranded costs – and a regulatory monopoly – serve as a barrier to entry
for new firms. Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 765 (2004)
(“Specifically, a number of distinguished commentators have argued that sunk costs can serve
as a potent barrier to entry. In particular, many large-scale infrastructure industries, such as
transportation and energy, are noncontestable.”). This regulatory structure requires citizens
in thirty-four states to purchase electricity from non-competitive firms. Current State of
Electricity Deregulation in the U.S., ELECTRIC CHOICE (Oct. 27, 2014),
https://www.electricchoice.com/blog/electricity-deregulation-states-2014/.
3. While some particularly tenacious and informed citizens may be able to provide
input into something like a utility’s integrated resource plan, these do not occur annually in
most states and still transpire within a process anathema to citizen input. See, e.g., Integrated
Resource Plan Otter Tail Power Company, ND PU-13-887 (1 filing, which indicates no
comments were received). Others show minimal participation: Duke Energy Carolinas IRP,
South Carolina 2016-10-E (3 filings); Cheyenne Light Wyoming 13439 (4 comments); South
Carolina Electric and Gas Company’s IRP 2014-9-E (5 filings).
4. The agencies actually want public participation. See Public Meetings &
Involvement,
U.S.
NUCLEAR
REGULATORY
COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/publicinvolve/open/public-participation.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). Unlike the South Carolina
IRP figures noted above, NRC had already received forty-four comments on license
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Some theories of administrative regulation would find the
increased participation a positive, while others discount the public
interest potentially present in regulators’ actions.5 Finding that an
empirical study of citizen input into these proceedings may
enlighten whether “enhanced” public participation actually leads
to a potentially better outcome for the public, this article proceeds
in four parts. First, three theories of administrative regulation are
summarized, followed by an overview of the consultation process
required for hydroelectric licensing. Analyzing the CatawbaWateree relicensing as a case study, this article outlines the
“enhanced” process used by Duke Energy and looks at two
quantifiable measures to attempt to determine which
administrative regulation theory is most represented practically in
at least one hydropower relicensing: first, an analysis of the
attendance of various stakeholder group meetings; and second, an
analysis of the groups who participated in the stakeholder
meetings but did not, in the end, sign on to the agreement which
came out of the process.6 The piece finishes with an analysis of
whether the general interests of the public were served by this
“enhanced” process and what can, therefore, be gleaned from the
administrative regulation theories.7 The conclusion indicates how
this analysis is relevant to other hydroelectric systems.

applications for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3, Docket NRC-2008-0441.
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=NRC-2008-0441. FERC provides a guide to the public
on how to get involved in hydropower relicensing efforts. Hydropower Licensing – Get Involved,
FEDERAL
ENERGY
REGULATORY
COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/resources/guides/hydropower/hydro-guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
5.

See infra Section II.

6.

See infra Section IV.

7. I recognize that other lenses could be used to analyze this data, specifically
theories of public participation in notice and comment rulemaking. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a Vision for Broader, More
Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (2013). However, that
discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION THEORIES AND
ENERGY
Commentators
have
advocated
that
outcomes
in
administrative regulation in the energy sphere can be explained
using different theories, although none have addressed
hydropower specifically. Starting with the dominant public choice
theory,8 this article then explores the public interest theory and the
civic republican theory, because these two are often used in the
environmental context and have, to a lesser degree, also been used
to explain energy regulation outcomes.9
A. Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory generally argues that “agencies deliver
regulatory benefits to well organized political interest groups,
which profit at the expense of the general, unorganized public.”10

8. Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution,
44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 353, 356 (2011). For energy-specific work, see, e.g., Matthew Wansley,
Virtuous Capture, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 419 (2015); Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy
and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379 (2009); Albert L.
Danielsen & Paul H. Rubin, An Empirical Investigation of Voting on Energy Issues, 31 PUB.
CHOICE 121, 123–28 (1977) (public choice explanation of variables affecting voting on energyrelated bills in 94th Congress).
9. See, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility
Industry, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 269 (1978) (public interest); William Boyd, Public Utility and the
Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014) (public interest); John S. Moot, Economic
Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L. J. 273 (2004) (public
interest); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (civic republican theories); Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political
Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L. J. 749 (1999) (discussing both public
choice and civic republican theories).
10. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998).
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Theorizing that regulatory decision-making is similar to market
decision-making, regulatory goods are demanded by those who
stand to gain from them.11 Only the state can supply these goods,
as the state is the sole regulator.12 The market works by private
actors, motivated by economic interest, trading with legislators,
motivated by private political interest, on the other side.13
Therefore, “the regulatory interests of the individual voter (or the
consumer) are dominated by the regulatory interests of organized
subgroups of the citizenry because the latter have incentives to
influence regulatory decision making which the former lacks.”14
Moreover, because utilities are typically a monopoly, individual
consumers or citizens have no practicable opportunity to exit the
regulatory market.15
In this theory, legislators do not protect the broad interests of
citizens because interested groups “who are informed because they
have an especially high demand for regulatory goods do monitor
legislators, punishing those who consistently fail to provide such
goods and rewarding those who provide favorable regulation.”16
Diffuse groups “will always be less well-funded than industry
groups,”17 leading to a continued state where citizens’ general
interests are not protected.18 Additionally, regulatory decisions will

11. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 335, 346 n.27 (1974) ("The government has a monopoly of the sale of regulation . . . .");
Croley, supra note 10, at 35 (listing that these regulatory goods can include “direct cash
subsidies, controls over entry into a market, such as tariffs, controls over the substitutes and
complements of economic goods, and price controls.”).
12.

Croley, supra note 10, at 35.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

Id. at 37.

16.

Id. at 38.

17. Josh Eagle, Complex and Murky Spatial Planning, 28 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
35, 47 (2012).
18. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 137,
140 (1975) (Public choice theory, however, could be contradicted if “for a given regulatory
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rarely be reexamined once made.19 So, once a favorable regulatory
outcome is procured, this state continues for a significant period of
time.
There are plenty of recent examples of where the public choice
theory seems to play out in the energy context: an emergency rate
increase for Mississippi Power Co. customers to pay for continued
cost increases and overruns at the Kemper County coal facility;20
the Ohio public utility commission considering guaranteeing a
profit for unprofitable generating plants by allowing a regulated
arm of one utility to purchase all output from its unregulated
arm;21 and fixed cost increases in Wisconsin and other states.22 In
all these examples, it is questionable that ratepayers’ general

policy, [it was] found the group with larger benefits and lower costs of political action [was]
dominated by another group with lesser benefits and higher costs of political action.”).
19.

Croley, supra note 10, at 37.

20. A less recent one is the exemption of hydraulic fracturing from the Safe Drinking
Water Act, which continues to have serious implications for the general citizenry. MARY
TIEMANN & ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41760, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND SAFE
DRINKING WATER ACT REGULATORY ISSUES 21–22 (2015), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, Hydraulic Fracturing and Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Issues, FAS.ORG (July
13, 2015) https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41760.pdf; Doug Walker, PSC grants new Kemper
rate hike for Mississippi Power, WDAM (Aug. 13, 2015, 11:20 AM),
http://www.wdam.com/story/29779701/psc-grants-new-kemper-rate-hike-for-mississippipower.
21. Dan Gearino, Deal in Works on Profit Guarantees for Ohio Plants of AEP,
FirstEnergy?,
THE
COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(Nov.
18,
2015),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2015/11/17/1117-power-profitguarantees.html.
22. Kari Lydersen, Amid Debate Over Fairness, Wisconsin Remains Outlier on Fixed
Charges,
MIDWEST
ENERGY
NEWS
(Nov.
23,
2015),
http://midwestenergynews.com/2015/11/23/amid-debate-over-fairness-wisconsin-remainsoutlier-on-fixed-charges/.
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interests are at the forefront, but it certainly can be argued that
well organized profit interests are receiving regulatory benefits.
Proponents of public choice theory often argue for increased
market reliance and less government regulation on grounds that
the market could operate more efficiently.23 It is also possible to see
how, in each of these instances, market forces may have provided
a better outcome for the individual ratepayer: a Mississippi electric
co-op, given the opportunity to not purchase electricity from the
Kemper facility as a result of schedule overruns, opted out of
purchasing any power from the facility and, instead, contracted for
wind generation for its ratepayers at a significantly lower cost.24
Unfortunately for them, Mississippi Power’s general customer
base does not have the same option.25 In the Ohio case, all economic
analyses, except the impacted utilities, indicate that ratepayers
would pay less for generation over the eight years if all generation
was simply purchased from the PJM market.26 As for the fixed cost
increases, these are primarily occurring in states that have
vertically-integrated utilities, not in states where competition
exists.27 In deregulated markets, customers are not seeing the
23. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
47, 88 (1969).
24. Daniel Cusick, CARBON CAPTURE: Electric power association pulls out of deal
with
flagship
Southern
Co.
coal
project,
E&E
NEWS,
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060019000 (last updated May 22, 2015, 4:12 PM).
25. Mississippi Power is a vertically-integrated utility, and Mississippi doesn’t have
customer choice. Company Overview of Mississippi Power Co., BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/Stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=3170623
(last
visited Oct. 31, 2016). Therefore, if you are in Mississippi Power’s territory, you can’t buy your
electricity from someone else.
26. “PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization (RTO) that
coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia” as well as operating a competitive
wholesale market covering the same territory. Who We Are, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/aboutpjm/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
27. This map shows where fixed charge proposals occurred in 2015, which largely
overlaps where there is no retail choice. The Year in Utility Rate Cases: Mandatory Fee Hikes
Retreat as Consumer Voices Pick up Steam, NATIONAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL (Dec. 18,
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same magnitude—nor the same rate—of fixed service costs
increasing.28 The public interest theory differs from the public
choice theory in that it sees situations in which the general public
could benefit.
B. Public Interest Theory
Public interest theory suggests that in addition to motivated
interest groups, regulators themselves have interests which can
align with the public good around issues in which the public has a
strong interest. The theory
concentrates on the general public's ability to monitor
regulatory decisionmakers. Where regulatory decision
makers operate under conditions of significant public
scrutiny, the public interest theory holds that regulatory
outcomes tend to reflect general interest. Where, on the
other hand, the relevant decisionmakers operate without
any oversight, they tend to deliver regulatory benefits to
well organized interest groups at the public's expense.29
Challenging the public choice theory, public interest theory
argues that “regulatory outcomes ameliorate market failures,” and

2015), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/samantha-williams/year-utility-rate-cases-mandatoryfee-hikes-retreat-consumer-voices-pick; Electric Industry Structure and Regulation, PENN.
STATE
COLLEGE
OF
EARTH
AND
MINERAL
SCIENCES,
https://www.eeducation.psu.edu/eme801/node/529 (last visited Sept. 28, 2016); Keeping the Lights on in
Competitive Retail Areas: MISO Moves Forward with Three year Forward Auction, MISO
MATTERS (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.misomatters.org/2016/08/keeping-the-lights-on-incompetitive-retail-areas-miso-moves-forward-with-three-year-forward-auction. MISO only
has retail choice in Illinois and parts of Michigan.
28.

NATIONAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, supra note 27.

29.

Croley, supra note 10, at 5.
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that regulation sometimes is in the general interest.30 The public
interest theory recognizes that members of the public—even those
interested in any given regulatory topic—have other competing
interests.31 Therefore, their participation and stake in regulation is
limited.32 Special interest groups, on the other hand, are more
interested in the regulatory outcome, and therefore are more active
in regulatory decision-making.33 Regulators act for selfpreservation, furthering special interests when that enables selfpreservation, and furthering general interests when those policies
enjoy broad public support.34
Citizens also, in many cases, have little motivation to monitor
regulators, because such monitoring would require significant
investments in time, information, and organization, whereas
special interests have much more incentive to monitor regulators.35
“The citizenry's obstacles to monitoring afford opportunities for
regulators to pursue narrow-interest policies to the detriment of
the citizenry's general interests.”36 The difference between the
theories, however, is when there is a “republican moment”: when
the public “temporarily overcomes” that clout that organized
interests typically have over regulatory decisions.37 At those times,
in issues with significant public interest where the citizenry is

30.

Id. at 66.

31.

Id.

32. Id. (“Members of the citizenry want, first, regulatory outcomes that satisfy their
preferences, and, second, the opportunity to pursue all of their other goals. In other words,
members of the citizenry seek what they consider to be desirable regulatory policies, but their
pursuit of desirable regulatory policies competes with their pursuit of other goals. Their stake
in regulatory policymaking is thus limited.”).
33.

Id.

34. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 177–81 (1990).
35.

Croley, supra note 10, at 68.

36.

Id.

37.

Sarah Tran, Cyber-Republicanism, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 383, 388 (2013).
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Public interest theory holds that how well regulatory outcomes
correct market failures is of primary importance.39 Therefore, the
entire point of regulation is to “protect the public from such evils
as monopoly behavior, ‘destructive’ competition, the abuse of
private economic power, or the effects of externalities.”40 However,
the public interest theory “currently suffers from a lack of
supporting empirical evidence,” as the evidence put forth by
proponents focuses on deregulation, rather than affirmative
regulation.41 One recent example that might support a public
interest theory of regulation, at least broadly, is the situation with
coal ash ponds in North Carolina. There was little oversight for
decades, but once the public became “especially cognizant” of the
issue with the Dan River spill,42 regulatory decisions have been, if

38.

Croley, supra note 10, at 69.

39.

Levine & Forrence, supra note 34, at 168.

40.

Id.

41.

Croley, supra note 10, at 74–75.

42. On Feb. 2, 2014, a pipe at Duke Energy’s Dan River coal plant near Eden, North
Carolina, ruptured, sending coal ash from an unlined pit into the river. An estimated 39,000
tons of ash fouled 70 miles of the Dan River. The failure was caused by the collapse of a
corrugated metal stormwater pipe that ran under the ash ponds. See Duke Energy Dan River
Coal Ash Spill Updates: What We Know, What We Need To Know, CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER
(2016), http://www.catawbariverkeeper.org/issues/coal-ash-1/duke-energy-dan-river-coal-ashspill-what-do-we-currently-know-what-do-we-need-to-know; See also Matthew Burns, Two
years later, NC fines Duke for coal ash spill, WRAL (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.wral.com/twoyears-later-nc-fines-duke-for-coal-ash-spill/15342212/. As far back as 1986, Duke consultants
had noted that the pipe was made of corrugated metal, which deteriorated with age. In 2007,
consultants also suggested a video inspection of the pipe, which also was not done. See Bruce
Henderson, N.C. fines Duke Energy $6.6 million for Dan River spill, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER
(Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article59277098.html.
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not completely in the public interest, at least arguably more so.43
Even with the higher level of citizen involvement with an issue in
the public spotlight, the public interest theory does not
contemplate the level of participation of the public in the civic
republican theory.
C. Civic Republican Theory
The civic republican theory posits that “government decisions
are a product of deliberation that respects and reflects the values
of all members of society” and that regulatory decision-making is
about the identification of shared regulatory values.44 Judgments
– and, therefore, regulatory decisions – are made “following a
process of dialogue and deliberation among all interested parties,
during the course of which those parties settle upon a decision
roughly constituting a consensus about the appropriate course of
regulatory action, given all concerns.”45 Unfortunately, the theory
is ambiguous about who, exactly, must participate in the
regulatory process,46 but the stated goal is to reflect the values of

43. The North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality fined Duke for
violations related to the Dan River spill, with the Secretary of DEQ noting that “[t]he state is
holding Duke Energy accountable so that it and others understand there are consequences to
breaking the law.” See Henderson, supra note 42. The North Carolina Legislature also passed
the Coal Ash Management Act of 2014, requiring Duke Energy to phase out wet storage of coal
ash. See Coal Ash Management Act of 2014, SIERRA CLUB NORTH CAROLINA CHAPTER (Aug.
21, 2014), http://nc.sierraclub.org/article/coal-ash-management-act-2014. However, with the
passage of time and less focus from citizens, the North Carolina Legislature passed a bill in
2016, which was signed by Governor McCrory, that allows Duke Energy to leave seven unlined
coal ash pits in place, rather than cleaning them up. See Samantha Page, New North Carolina
Bill Allows Duke Energy to Dodge Coal Ash Cleanup Again, THINK PROGRESS (July 1, 2016),
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2016/07/01/3794935/duke-doesnt-have-to-clean-up-its-ash/;
See also Drinking Water Protect’n/Coal Ash Cleanup Act, NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
(July
14,
2016),
http://www.
ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2015&BillID=H630.
44.

Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 1514.

45.

Croley, supra note 10, at 77.

46.

Id.
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all members of society and reach consensus on the common good.47
Unlike the public choice or public interest theories, the civic
republican theory implies that, rather than coming in with fixed
positions, the outcomes desired by those participating in
regulatory decision-making mature during the process and that
those participants all are somewhat public-minded.48
Proponents of the civic republican theory want to dilute
special interest influence by encouraging widespread public
participation in policymaking.49 This input should include the
participation of “representatives of less concentrated concerns.”50
This goal could be accomplished by engaging the public in many
ways, and then having the agency rely to a greater extent on this
information. By allowing for broader participation, the civic
republican theory hopes to disallow concentrated groups from
obtaining favorable regulation.51 This broad public participation
also aligns with theories regarding what is good about a regulatory
state and administrative decision-making.52
Notably, each of these three theories would predict a
different regulatory outcome for a hydropower regulatory process.
Public choice would suggest that the hydropower applicant would
be able to heavily influence the process and obtain license

47.

Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 1514.

48. Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946,
72 VA. L. REV. 271, 272, 282 (1986).
49.

Croley, supra note 10, at 80.

50. Steve Kelman, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution
in Public Policy Making, 11 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT. 178, 195 (1982).
51.

Croley, supra note 10, at 80–81.

52. Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 1515 (“[H]aving administrative agencies set
government policy provides the best hope . . . for deliberative decisionmaking informed by the
values of the entire policy.”).
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conditions not necessarily in the common good, but which would
serve the applicant well. Public interest would indicate that this
influence could happen, excepting a “republican moment” or
regulators acting in what they feel is the public good, even without
heavy scrutiny. Finally, civic republicanism would argue for the
maximum public participation possible, with consensus reached
for the common good during the process of deliberations among all
parties and with all options available to be considered. The
licensing process itself does not indicate which will occur, as there
is sufficient latitude in the process for any one of these to occur.
III. THE FERC HYDROELECTRIC LICENSING PROCESS
Under the Federal Power Act,53 the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) “has the exclusive authority to license most
nonfederal hydropower projects on navigable waterways . . .”54 The
FERC may issue a new license for up to fifty years, and a relicense
for between thirty to fifty years.55 In making the decision about the
license, the FERC “must give equal consideration to developmental
and environmental values.”56 The FERC must include conditions in
the license to adequately protect (or mitigate damage to) fish and
other wildlife.57 During the term of the license, the FERC monitors
compliance with the license conditions; failure to comply with the
license conditions can lead to civil penalties or rescission of the
license.58 At the end of any license, the FERC may issue another

53.

16 U.S.C. §§ 791–1791(a) (repealed 1935).

54. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N., 1-1, HANDBOOK FOR HYDROELECTRIC
PROJECT
LICENSING
AND
5
MW
EXEMPTIONS
FROM
LICENSING
(2004),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/handbooks/licensing_handbook.pdf.
55.

Id.

56. “Environmental values include: fish and wildlife resources, including their
spawning grounds and habitat, visual resources, cultural resources, recreational
opportunities, and other aspects of environmental quality. Developmental values include
power generation, irrigation, flood control, and water supply.” Id. at 1-2.
57.

Id. at 1-4.

58.

Id.
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relicense, the federal government may take over the project, or the
project can be decommissioned.59
The hydroelectric licensing process used by the FERC has
changed over the years. Since 1997, applicants had the choice
between two potential regulatory licensing processes: the
Traditional Licensing Process and the Alternative Licensing
Process.60 In 2005, the FERC changed approach again,
implementing the Integrated Licensing Process as the preferred
option.61 This article will discuss the traditional licensing process,
as that is what was used in the Catawba-Wateree license

59.

Id. at 1-1.

60. See Uncertainty? for sure, WATER POWER MAGAZINE (Nov. 16, 2001),
http://www.waterpowermagazine.com/features/featureuncertainty-for-sure/. Factors that
impact which process the applicant uses include: the availability and skill of staff; timing;
whether the license is offered competitively or whether it is a relicensing of an existing system;
if there are high profile issues; and whether settlement of most issues is a realistic possibility.
Id. Interestingly, I have been unable to find a tabulation of how many applicants chose each
of these options.
61. The Traditional or Alternative Licensing approaches were in use until 2005.
Licensing
Processes, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (May
7,
2015),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/licen-pro.asp. Starting in 2005,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required the use of an Integrated Licensing
Process (“ILP”) for all original, new or subsequent licenses. Id. The ILP was intended to provide
“a predictable, efficient, and timely licensing process” that includes the “[i]ntegration of other
stakeholder permitting process needs . . . .” Integrated Licensing Process (ILP), FED. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMM’N (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/geninfo/licensing/ilp.asp. A relicensing is considered a “subsequent” license. Licensing Processes,
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (May 7, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/industrie
s/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/licen-pro.asp. Commission approval is now required to use
either the Traditional or the Alternative Licensing Process, rather than the Integrated
Licensing Process. Id. Interestingly, at least one law firm has found that the ILP “can provide
some level of comfort that an overzealous stakeholder will be limited in their ability to hold up
the relicensing process.” Laura Cowan, The Three Relicensing Processes: Kleinschmidt’s
Experience
and
Recommendations
to
Licensees,
KLEINSCHMIDT
GROUP
5,
http://www.kleinschmidtgroup.com/files/8113/9721/9442/The_Three_Relicensing_Processes__KAs_Experience_and_Recommendations_to_Licensees_-_LJC.pdf.
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renewal.62 While the traditional process was used, applicants like
Duke Energy often “enhanced” the traditional licensing process,
and those enhancements are also highlighted.63
A. Traditional Licensing Process
The traditional process minimizes public interaction and prefiling costs while also giving the applicant “more opportunity to
shape the process and tell its story.”64 In the Traditional Licensing
Process (“TLP”), the applicant completes a three-stage
consultation process with a variety of stakeholders prior to filing
an application for an operating license.65 To start the process, the
applicant develops a document which includes the following about
the hydroelectric project: detailed maps; the general engineering
design; a summary of the existing operations and any proposed
changes; identification of the affected environment and proposed
mitigation measures; streamflow information; study descriptions
and proposed methodologies; and a notice to fish and wildlife
agencies, if the applicant is requesting a new dam or diversion.66
This document must be provided to federal agencies, tribes,
state agencies, and members of the public.67 While not specifying

62. While the Catawba-Wateree license was not submitted until 2006, Duke Energy
submitted an intent to relicense in 2003, and chose the traditional licensing process at that
point. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, COMPREHENSIVE RELICENSING AGREEMENT
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT FOR THE CATAWBA-WATEREE HYDRO PROJECT P-2232,
http://www.psc.sc.gov/Documents/Allowable%20Ex%20Parte%20Briefings/Ex_Parte_Briefing
_Materials_05-29-2009_6CRA.pdf. Therefore, Duke Energy was not required to use the ILP
even though the application was submitted after 2005.
63.

WATER POWER MAGAZINE, supra note 60.

64.

Id.

65. Licensing Processes, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (May 7, 2015),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/licen-pro.asp.
66.

18 C.F.R. §§ 16.8(b)(2)(i – vii), 4.301(a)(1 – 2) (2016).

67.
Before it files any application for an original, new, or subsequent license
under this part, a potential applicant must consult with the relevant
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how the information must be conveyed to the public, the rule
requires that a “licensee must make the information . . . reasonably
available to the public for inspection and reproduction . . . until the
date any relicensing proceeding for the project is terminated.”68
Then, between thirty and sixty days after the document is
provided, the applicant must hold a joint meeting, including a site
visit with everyone in the group who wishes to participate.69 The
FERC’s rules specifically allow that members of the public are
invited to attend and participate fully, including expressing views
on any resource issues that should be addressed in the licensing
process.70 After the joint meeting, everyone involved, including the

Federal, state, and interstate resource agencies, including as appropriate
the National Marine Fisheries Service, the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, the National Park Service, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal agency
administering any United States lands utilized or occupied by the project,
the appropriate state fish and wildlife agencies, the appropriate state
water resource management agencies, the certifying agency or Indian
tribe under Section 401(a)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(1)), the agency that administers
the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451–1465, any Indian
tribe that may be affected by the project, and members of the public. A
potential license applicant must file a notification of intent to file a license
application pursuant to § 5.5 and a pre-application document pursuant to
the provisions of § 5.6.
Id. § 5.1(d)(1). See also id. § 5.6(a)(1) (listing in more detail those who the applicant may be
required to consult with).
68. Id. § 16.7(b). Practically, the FERC publishes all information, by docket, on its
website. Specifically, for the Catawba-Wateree relicensing, the information was available at
the Public Library of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County, 310 N. Tryon Street, Charlotte, NC
28202. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 91 (FERC
2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20030722-0302.
69.

Id. § 16.8.

70. Id. However, the applicant has the ability to exclude the public from any site visit
held in conjunction with the joint meeting. Id.
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general public, has sixty days to submit comments to the
applicant.71 However, the comments are to be structured around
the studies necessary for the hydroelectric application to be
complete.72 The first stage of the consultation process is complete
when the written comments are provided or sixty days after the
joint meeting, whichever comes first.73
During the second stage of the consultation process, the
required studies are performed, the results complied, and those
results provided to interested parties.74 Those interested parties
are requested to review the studies and provide written
comments.75 Agencies, tribes, and members of the public then have
ninety days to provide written comments.76 If “substantive
disagreement” exists between the applicant and an interested
party “regarding resource impacts or its proposed protection,
mitigation, or enhancement measures,” the applicant consults with
the “disagreeing” party and others “with similar or related areas of
interest, expertise, or responsibility” and holds at least one joint
meeting with those parties “to attempt to reach agreement . . .”77 If

71.

Id. § (b)(5).

72. Id. Should an applicant and agency, tribe, or member of the public disagree
regarding the need to conduct a study, the applicant, agency, tribe, or member of the public
must request referral of the dispute to the Director of the Office of Energy Projects for
resolution. If the applicant disagrees and the study is maintained by the FERC and the
applicant does not request the matter go to dispute resolution, the applicant will be required
to complete the study or their application will be found deficient. If an agency, tribe, or
member of the public does not request dispute resolution, they will be barred from using the
lack of the study as a reason to reject the license later in the licensing process. Id. § (b)(6).
73.

Id. § (b)(7).

74. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 65. (Second Stage Applicant
completes reasonable and necessary studies; Applicant provides draft application and study
results to resource agencies and tribes; Resource agencies and tribes comment on draft
application; and Applicant conducts meeting if substantive disagreements exist.).
75.

18 C.F.R. § 16.8 (c)(4). The results do not have to go through formal peer review.

76.

Id. § 16.8 (c)(5).

77.

Id. § (c)(6).
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agreement is reached, that consensus is memorialized in a written
document; if disagreements persist, the applicant must describe
the disagreement, including why the applicant disagrees with the
position of the interested party, and include that in its application
to the FERC.78 The second stage then ends either when ninety days
has passed after the study results are provided or after the last
joint meeting based on substantive disagreements concludes.79
The third stage of consultation begins with the applicant filing
the application for a license.80 That application must also be
submitted to agencies, tribes, and interested members of the
public.81 The application must include descriptions of any
disagreements discovered during stage two.82 Additionally, an
applicant can submit any consensus documents agreed to during
stage two as a settlement to the FERC.83 The FERC then conducts
an independent environmental analysis under NEPA,84 establishes
conditions of the new license, and decides whether to issue the new
license.85 The FERC is not bound by the consensus agreements

78.

Id. § (c)(7–8).

79.

Id. § (c)(10)(i–ii).

80.

Id. § (d)(1).

81.

Id. § (d)(2).

82.

18 C.F.R. § 16.8(f)(3).

83. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 91
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20061116-0145.
84. The NEPA process typically takes between 2 and 7 years. See Hydropower
Licensing, NORTHWEST HYDROELECTRIC ASS’N (2013), http://www.nwhydro.org/wpcontent/uploads/resources/laws_regulations/hydropower_licensing.htm. This NEPA process
includes the standard processes for public input.
85. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Preparing Environmental
Documents:
Guidelines
for
Applicants,
Contractors,
and
Staff
(2008),
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from earlier stages, but instead can implement conditions it
determines are in the public interest.86
B. The “Enhanced” or “Hybrid” Process
While existing nowhere in regulations and not technically
recognized by the FERC as a licensing process, an “enhanced”
process has come to be commonly used by applicants for
hydroelectric relicensing.87 The enhanced process is “a traditional,
three-stage process with some sort of enhanced stakeholder
consultation - but neither NEPA scoping nor a NEPA document . .
.”88 This lack of a formal NEPA document is one specific reason why
applicants would choose to undertake an “enhanced” TLP rather
than one of the other regulatory paths available – while the FERC
will still assess the project under NEPA, that requirement does not
fall to the applicant.89 Therefore, while the “enhanced” process is
not part of the formal environmental assessment, the applicant has
the ability to understand what aspects of the relicensing are
important or contentious and may come up during the NEPA
process. This “enhanced” process provides the ability for the
applicant to negotiate with groups before formally submitting the
license application. The “enhanced” process ends with a settlement
agreement that can become part of the application to the FERC,
indicating agreement for the proposed license conditions contained
therein.90 “The key to success of a hybrid process is to demonstrate

http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/guidelines/eaguide.pdf; See also Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, supra note 4.
86.

18 C.F.R. § 16.13.

87. The
Relicensing
Process,
AMERICAN
WHITEWATER,
http://www.americanwhitewater.org/content/Wiki/stewardship:relicensing_overview#hybrid
(last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
88.

WATER POWER MAGAZINE, supra note 60.

89.

NORTHWEST HYDROELECTRIC ASS’N, supra note 84.

90. For a partial list of hydroelectric relicenses that have resulted in settlements, see
HYDROPOWER
REFORM
COALITION,
Settlement
Agreements
app.
C
(2016),
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with a comprehensive settlement agreement that the package of
resource measures captured in the agreement is best adapted to
address competing resource goals and is in the public interest.”91
However, as one environmental group noted regarding “enhanced”
relicensing, “the licensee has no requirement to collaborate fairly
or honor informal agreements” made during an “enhanced”
process.92
The “enhanced” process allows for more data on public
participation to be developed during the process than a traditional
licensing process, as more data is developed than simply comments
into the NEPA process. Allowing an empirical analysis not often
available in energy regulation, the data from the “enhanced”
process can be analyzed to determine whether the additional public
participation actually resulted in a regulatory outcome that
potentially provided for the common good. A very recent
relicensing, the Catwaba-Wateree, provides that opportunity to
study an “enhanced” relicensing process.
IV. THE CATAWBA-WATEREE RELICENSING
Consisting of thirteen hydroelectric power plants on eleven
lakes spanning nine counties in North Carolina and five counties
in South Carolina, the Catawba-Wateree system occupies more
than 200 river miles.93 In addition to providing more than 800 MW
of hydropower, the reservoirs also provide cooling water to over

http://www.hydroreform.org/hydroguide/hydropower-licensing/citizen-toolkit-for-effectiveparticipation/Appendix_C.
91.

INT’L WATER POWER & DAM CONSTR., supra note 60.

92.

AMERICAN WHITEWATER, supra note 87.

93. About
the
Catawba-Wateree,
DUKE
ENERGY,
http://www.dukeenergy.com/catawba-wateree-relicensing/about-cw.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
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7,700 MW of fossil-fuel and nuclear generation.94 The CatawbaWateree was first licensed by the Federal Power Commission on
September 17, 1958.95
Duke Energy Carolinas (“Duke”) submitted its intent to file a
relicensing application for the Catawba-Wateree hydroelectric
system on July 21, 2003.96 This notice did not include any
information about which relicensing process Duke intended to
use.97 Many stakeholders were understandably interested in the
licensing application process; the Catawba-Wateree system
provides drinking water for nearly two million people, and more
than ten million use the system for recreation each year.98
Additionally, NASA scientists have hypothesized that water
scarcity will be coming to the Southeast, and rainfall in the
Catawba River basin has already dropped ten percent in the last
fifty years.99 Potential controversies included flood management,
water quality, recreational opportunities, land conservation,
migratory fish and endangered species, and minimum flows.100
Duke completed the consultation steps required under the
FERC’s Traditional Licensing Process and filed its application for

94. Duke Energy's new Catawba-Wateree operating license highlights the benefits of
cooperation, DUKE ENERGY (Nov. 25, 2015), http://news.duke-energy.com/releases/dukeenergy-s-new-catawba-wateree-operating-license-highlights-the-benefits-of-cooperationbetween-the-company-and-communities.
95.

Order Issuing License, 20 F.P.C. 360 (1958).

96. Application for a New License for the Catawba-Wateree Hydroelectric Project,
(FERC 2003) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20030210 [hereinafter Duke Power Notice].
97.

Id.

98.

DUKE ENERGY, supra note 94.

99. Bruce Henderson, NASA scientist: Southeast faces a scarcity of water, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article47457280.html.
100. See, e.g., Application for a New License Regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project
at 109, (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0548 (listing major issues of concern).
See also id. at 100 (“the environmental, recreational, and cultural needs of the north
Mecklenburg community are not fulfilled . . . .”).
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relicensing on August 29, 2006.101 The application noted that Duke
used an “enhanced” Traditional Licensing Process; that its existing
license for the Catawba-Wateree system was set to expire on
August 31, 2008; and that Duke was requesting a new license to
continue operation for fifty years.102
While not specific to the Catawba-Wateree relicensing, Duke
has stated that “enhancing the FERC’s relicensing processes to
promote stakeholder involvement provides benefits to the
relicensing process. Further, enhanced stakeholder participation
in hydroelectric project re-licensing can result in relicensing
agreements among many stakeholder organizations.”103 Therefore,
the company seems to feel that the “enhanced” process is the best
way for it to interact with its stakeholders. However, other possible
explanations for using the process do exist. Less altruistically, it is
possible that using the “enhanced” process was a good way to “look
collaborative” while balancing to get to an outcome that Duke could
live with. More cynically, it could appear to take others’ interests
into account, knowing that while the relicensing process was going
on it could continue to operate as it always had.104 Also, if the
settlement agreement at the end of the process was insufficient,
the stakeholder process would simply delay the issuance of the

101. See Application for a New License Regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 8,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0155 [hereinafter Application, Submittal
20060927-0155].
102.

Id.

103. Relicensing Agreements, DUKE ENERGY, https://www.duke-energy.com/keoweetoxaway-relicensing/relicensing-agreements.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
104. Stakeholders also seemed to recognize this as a possibility. One pointed out that
“ILP and Alternative Licensing Process (ALP) both call for collaboration, but the Traditional
Licensing Process (TLP) hybrid allows Duke not to have to follow certain collaborative rules
and still reap the benefits a collaborative provides.” Application for a New License regarding
the Catawba-Wateree Project at 98–99, (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0555.
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relicense, but that would also delay any new environmental
mitigation that Duke would have to undertake.105
Whatever the reason, the “enhanced” process meant that,
instead of using only the consultation process required (which
Duke termed the “regulatory” track), Duke also met, in parallel,
with stakeholders to develop a consensus that could be used as the
basis for license conditions that could be submitted to the FERC,
demonstrating additional stakeholder buy-in (and ensuring the
groups who signed would not sue).106 Duke called this second track
the “stakeholder” track.107 The “regulatory” track and the
“stakeholder” track had many common participants who regularly
exchanged information.108
A. The Regulatory Track
In the “regulatory” track, Duke completed stage one in July
2003, and moved into stage two in August, 2003.109 Taking three
years to complete stage two, Duke completed twenty-seven studies
to meet regulatory requirements.110 The “stakeholder” track then
merged into the “regulatory” track when the agreed-upon
provisions of the stakeholder agreement were incorporated into the

105. A discussion of the corporate use of due process – where a regulated entity uses
a public process to guide agency decision making that should be in the public interest – is also
beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation:
Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J.
377 (2006).
106.

Application, Submittal 20060927-0155, supra note 101, at 15–22.

107.

Id. at 15.

108.

Id. at 56.

109.

Id. at 16.

110. Id. at 17. Duke had many other requests, which it did not study; it stated that
“[o]ther requests (a) did not ask for a study per se but for an outcome; (b) expressed an interest
that could be raised in stakeholder negotiations; (c) related to an activity that is already a
current practice of the Licensee; (d) related to relicensing activities that are administered by
the FERC; (e) made certain study methodology or relicensing process requests or (f) did not
meet one of the preceding four study criteria.” Id. at 57.
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license application.111 Stage three began when Duke filed its new
license application in August of 2006, and was completed when the
FERC issued Duke its new operating license on November 25,
2015.112
B. The Stakeholder Track
In an attempt to obtain consensus during the relicensing
process, Duke worked with over 160 stakeholders representing
eighty-five organizations.113 The goals of the stakeholder process
were to provide stakeholders with: “1) opportunities for discovery,
information sharing and education; 2) a direct role in developing,
reviewing and discussing the studies necessary to support the
license application; 3) a direct role in negotiating agreements that
resolve the issues and balance the interests relative to the New
License for the Project; and 4) measures to inform the public about
the topics being addressed in the process.”114 More succinctly, the
goal “was to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on all interests
related to the project.”115 While federal agencies provided input into
the process and did attend some meetings, none formally took part
in the process.116

111.

Application, Submittal 20060927-0155, supra note 101, at 56.

112.

DUKE ENERGY, supra note 94.

113. Application, Submittal 20060927-0155, supra note 101, at 7; DUKE ENERGY,
supra note 94.
114. See Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 5,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0545.
115. Collaborative relicensing, INT’L WATER POWER & DAM CONSTR. (Oct. 9, 2006),
http://www.waterpowermagazine.com/features/featurecollaborative-relicensing/.
116. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision not to sign on was especially
discussed given the potential impact a future Biological Opinion could have on the operation
of the dams. USFWS did not sign because “the charter, as written, compromises the agencies'
statutory authority.” Application for a New License: Stakeholder Process and Consultation at
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Those involved in the stakeholder process started out
expressing individual interests they wanted to secure during the
relicensing; for Duke, the primary interest was “to maintain
generating flexibility” as well as operational flexibility to use the
system to generate electricity for peak periods.117 After all the
interests were discussed, an initial draft of an agreement was
circulated and negotiations started. Multiple suggestions by
stakeholders during the drafting process regarding their interests
were dismissed with little discussion as something Duke was not
prepared to agree to.118 Stakeholders also noted that Duke

98, (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0555. Duke surmised that the agencies’
decision not to sign was, in fact, a way to attempt to pressure them into a different licensing
arrangement. Id. (“He surmised that perhaps DOl's decision was an attempt to try and push
Duke toward an Integrated Licensing Process (ILP).”); Catawba-Wateree Project Application
for a New License: Stakeholder Process and Consultation at 13, (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522),
Submittal 20060927-0608 (“Lineberger explained that, in his opinion, the USFWS's decision
seems to be based entirely on the fact that they would prefer this to be an ILP rather than a
TLP and that this is a different directive than the one that the USFWS had during the
Nantahala Area relicensing. [A stakeholder] disagreed and indicated that perhaps the reason
the USFWS was unwilling to sign/agree to the charter had more to do with the fact that Duke
was unwilling to give up their authority.”).
117. Catawba-Wateree Project Application for a New License: Stakeholder Process
and Consultation at 81, (FERC 2009) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0576 (“Additionally,
Duke Power wants to retain the operational flexibility of peaking.”) [hereinafter Application,
Submittal 20060927-0576].
118. These primarily focused on flow conditions, including maximum flows. CatawbaWateree Project Application for a New License: Stakeholder Process and Consultation at 99
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0575 (“Blackburn continued by explaining
that Duke Power is not prepared to agree to something that will limit them to a maximum
flow . . .” when discussing wade fishing interests); speed-no-load or bypass flows, CatawbaWateree Project Application for a New License: Stakeholder Process and Consultation at 16,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0605 [hereinafter Stakeholder, Submittal
20060927-0605]; a flow regime that recognizes when there is more water and provides it for
diadromous fish in those cases. Id. at 17–18 (“Lineberger stated that the language included in
Section 4 of the current draft AlP is all Duke Power is willing to do.”); flow passage, CatawbaWateree Project Application for a New License: Stakeholder Process and Consultation at 66,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0565 (“. . . Duke Power has agreed to
operations and costs associated with fish passage however they have not agreed to flow
passage.” and that a stakeholder “. . . would like to see that aspect of fish passages and flows
addressed”); and that Duke was “not going to put money to something else” if one recreational
project it agreed to fell through, even though other stakeholders felt that there were other
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“control[led] the negotiations,” that “the ultimate power lies in
Duke’s hands,”119 that they did not feel ownership of the negotiated
document,120 that “the public will be subject to Duke Power's
whims,”121 and that they believed the process was rigged and
geared in Duke’s favor.122 When one stakeholder asked how Duke
formulated tradeoffs, the response was that Duke determined
them using “1) Duke's interests 2) those interests affecting Duke's
interests and 3) study results.”123 Trust was further undermined

priorities the money could be used for. Catawba-Wateree Project Application for a New
License: Stakeholder Process and Consultation at 134, (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal
20060927-0602 [hereinafter Application, Submittal 20060927-0602]. Even the USFWS asked
“if Duke is interested in additional flows . . . that would provide for other habitat values not
addressed in the AlP. Lineberger said he believes flows in the current AlP provide the best
balance and Duke is not interested in additional flows . . .” Catawba-Wateree Project
Application for a New License: Stakeholder Process and Consultation at 19, (FERC 2006) (P2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0605.
119. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 15,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0587.
120. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 98,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0610.
121. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 96,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0574.
122. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 123,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0604. (“Several stakeholders commented on
their belief that this process is uneven and it is geared in Duke's favor.” “In response to [a
stakeholder’s] accusation that [the facilitator] is giving an unfair advantage towards to Duke
in this process by stating that some issues are irresolvable, [one of the facilitators] explained
that his business interests don't allow him to ignore stakeholders because of [the facilitator’s]
involvement in other relicensings and dealings with others in the hydro industry.”).
123. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 97,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0612. Duke also admitted to stakeholders
that there would be data from studies that they would not be willing to share. Id. Application
for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 23, (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522),
Submittal 20060927-0566. (“[A stakeholder] asked if Duke anticipates that there will be data
from the studies that Duke would not want to make public, like Indian sites or things that
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during the negotiations by the sale of property by a Duke Energy
subsidiary that had been listed as a priority for conservation by
multiple parties.124
Realizing that some stakeholders would be interested in only
certain issues or certain geographies, Duke determined it would be
more expedient to break the Catawba-Wateree geography into
distinct segments and focus certain teams on each.125 Six teams
were formed on this basis: two state relicensing teams, who had
responsibility for all the interests in each state, and four advisory
groups, focused on a smaller part of the entire project.126 Interested
members of the public had to apply to become part of one of the
teams.127
After the teams were formed, decision-making within the
teams was very structured. After discussion on an item, consensus
was identified.128 If there was doubt that consensus existed, any
team member could request that consensus be tested.129 Testing

impact Duke’s profits or costs. Johnson replied that Duke will be presenting economic values
to the group but some things are trade secrets and will not be made public.”).
124. Crescent Resources, a subsidiary of Duke Energy, contracted for the sale of the
Singleton tract to a developer while negotiations around its conservation were ongoing in the
Catawba-Wateree stakeholder process. The 3,500-acre tract represented nearly five miles of
contiguous, undeveloped shoreline on Lake Wateree. Duke refused to stop the transaction,
even though that specific tract had been identified in the South Carolina land conservation
negotiations. Stakeholders felt this “short-circuited” the negotiation process, especially since
land conservation was a top priority for many taking part in the process, and that it was hard
to find the motivation to continue since the supply of land for conservation had significantly
decreased. Duke’s response was that this is “corporate reality.” Application for a New License
regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 63–64, (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal
20060927-0612.
125. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 3,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0545.
126.

Id. at 5.

127.

Id. at 3–4.

128.

Id. at 16.

129.

Id. at 17.
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consisted of each team member indicating his or her concurrence
on a five point scale: 1) endorsement; 2) endorsement with minor
point of contention; 3) agreement with minor reservations; 4) stand
aside with major reservations; or 5) block.130 If, for any item, a team
member suggested that he or she strongly disagreed and could not
support the agreement if a particular provision was a part of it,
that team member was expected to leave the stakeholder process
entirely.131 This scale and formal voting allowed team members to
clarify how much agreement existed on any given point.132 If
significant disagreement existed at the end of the process, those
disagreeing were given “500 words or less” to specify why they had
major reservations or were dissenting from the final document.133
To get to the consensus document, Duke indicates that six
stakeholder teams met a total of 315 times.134 The two state
relicensing teams, the North Carolina State Relicensing Team
(“NCSRT”) and the South Carolina State Relicensing Team
(“SCSRT”), met forty-one and forty-two times, respectively,
between July, 2003, and July, 2006.135 The four advisory teams met

130.

Id. at 18.

131. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 9,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0545. “Stand aside with major reservations”
also had two sub-parts that a team member was expected to choose between: a) do not have
sufficient information; and b) formal disagreement, but will not block. Id.
132.

Id.

133.

Id. at 10.

134. See id. at 14. Duke has provided attendance records for 221 meetings, which are
analyzed here. See infra Appendix. The other meetings may have been resource committee
meetings, study team meetings, or ad hoc committee meetings, but it is unclear based on the
relicensing documents what the other 94 meetings are. No other attendance records were
provided in the relicensing documents other than those analyzed here.
135. See Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 14,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0545.
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similarly frequently.136 The NC Foothills Advisory Group
(“Foothills AG”) met thirty-four times over the three-year period;
the NC Metro Advisory Group (“Metro AG”) met thirty-five times;
the SC Piedmont Advisory Group (“Piedmont AG”) met thirty-five
times; and the SC Lower Catawba Advisory Group (“Lower
Catawba AG”) thirty-four times.137
The question then becomes: How many meetings are too
many?138 For citizens taking part in the process—unlike Duke
employees or the employees of federal or state agencies—the time
spent in meetings is often uncompensated.139 While motivations to
participate in the process were not recorded, it would seem that
many of these citizens or groups felt that, at least at the beginning,
there was a potential for the process to lead to a favorable
regulatory outcome. Attendance can be seen as a proxy for several
measures, including stakeholder motivation, the potential amount
of public oversight, and the amount of collective deliberation which
occurred in the process. Those team members who do not feel
invested in the process, who do not feel that the process
incorporated their points of view, or addressed their concerns were
likely to attend fewer meetings because the meetings would be
viewed as simply a waste of time. Lower attendance could also
occur if team members realized that any eventual regulatory
outcome that reflected their goals was unlikely or if participants
did not feel that each meeting was impactful—e.g., if it would not
be possible to get enough out of the process by attending only every
third meeting.

136.

See id.

137.

See id.

138. It was apparently recognized that the frequency and number of meetings was
taking a toll, noting at one point that, when attempting to schedule an additional meeting, “. .
. teleconferencing was something that could certainly be done realizing that it is difficult for
people to attend the meetings.” Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree
Project at 12, (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0579.
139. Transcript, at 16, In the Matter of: Catawba-Wateree Relicensing Project, (FERC
2007) (P-2232-522), Issuance 20070326-4037.
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In order to analyze participation, I have examined the
attendance records for each of the six teams, breaking the
participants into three groups: 1) Duke employees; 2) the
employees of federal and state agencies, including members of the
Catawba nation and local governments, commissions and
authorities; and 3) other stakeholders. The “other” group includes
interested citizens, neighboring landowners, homeowners’
associations, environmental and recreational groups, and
businesses with an interest in the relicensing process.140 A FERC
representative was not a team member of any team.141
1. NCSRT
The NCSRT consisted of two Duke employees, ten members
representing federal or state agencies or Indian tribes, and four
representing other stakeholder groups.142 Looking at attendance
across the entire series of forty-one meetings, the Duke employees
averaged 96.4% attendance; officials averaged 45.9% attendance;
and other stakeholders averaged 70.7% attendance.143
2. SCSRT
The SCSRT consisted of two Duke employees, ten members
representing federal or state agencies or Indian tribes, and seven
representing other stakeholder groups.144 Looking at attendance
140.

See infra Appendix.

141. See Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 11,
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0545.
142.
Appendix.

This comes from counting the members on the attendance sheets. See infra

143. This comes from calculating the attendance based on the attendance sheets. See
infra Appendix.
144. See Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0545.
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across the entire series of forty-two meetings, the Duke employees
averaged 96.4% attendance; officials averaged 56.2% attendance;
and other stakeholders averaged 53.7% attendance.145
3. Foothills
The Foothills AG consisted of four Duke employees; twentyone members representing federal, state, county or local
governments, or Indian tribes; and nineteen members
representing other stakeholder groups. For the thirty-four
meetings, Duke employees averaged 78.7% attendance; officials
averaged 45.5% attendance; and other stakeholders averaged
60.2% attendance.146
4. Metro
The Metro AG consisted of three Duke employees; twenty-two
members representing federal, state, county or local governments,
or Indian tribes; and thirteen members representing other
stakeholder groups. For the thirty-five meetings, the Duke
employees averaged 78.1% attendance; officials averaged 52.9%
attendance; and other members averaged 48.8% attendance.147
5. Piedmont
The Piedmont AG consisted of four Duke employees; sixteen
members representing federal, state, county or local governments,
or Indian tribes; and eleven members representing other
stakeholder groups.148 For the thirty-five meetings, the Duke
employees averaged 65.0% attendance; the officials averaged

145.

See infra Appendix.

146.

See infra Appendix.

147.

See infra Appendix.

148.

See infra Appendix.
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36.8% attendance; and those representing other stakeholder
groups averaged 58.7% attendance.149
6. Lower Catawba
The Lower Catawba AG consisted of four Duke employees; ten
members representing federal, state, county or local governments,
or Indian tribes; and nineteen members representing other
stakeholder groups.150 For the thirty-four meetings, the Duke
employees averaged 69.1% attendance; the officials averaged
47.1% attendance; and other stakeholders averaged 60.7%
attendance.151

Duke
Officials
Others

NCSRT
96%
46%
71%

SCSRT Foothills
96%
79%
56%
46%
54%
60%

Metro Piedmont Lower Catawba
78%
65%
69%
53%
37%
47%
49%
59%
61%

Analyzing these groups, Duke’s average attendance is higher
than the other groups in a statistically significant way.
Statistically, there is no difference between the participation of the
officials and other groups. Noteworthy is that members of the
public participated as much—and, in some cases, more—than
federal, state, or tribal officials. This seems to suggest, at a
minimum, that public interest was at least as strong as “official”
interest.

149.

See infra Appendix.

150.

See infra Appendix.

151.

See infra Appendix.
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C. The CRA – Where the Two Tracks Come Back Together
To gauge consensus while the agreement was being drafted,
several confidential all-team assessments—where individuals
could indicate how they would vote if the draft agreement were to
be signed at that moment—were completed. The first, with results
reported on September 15, 2005, indicated that out of a total of
thirty-eight participants, twelve (or almost 32%) ranked the
agreement a five, meaning they would not support it.152 An
additional 16, or 42%, ranked it a four, indicating that they had
serious reservations about the draft.153 Therefore, the first time
they were asked about progress on a final agreement, a full 74%
either had serious reservations or were just saying “no.”
Duke attempted to respond to the feedback in the draft
assessment, finding that 7% of the issues raised by stakeholders
were irrelevant to the draft; that changes in the draft were not
needed to address 30% of the concerns; and that Duke could accept
suggested draft changes in 4% of the cases.154 Perhaps admitting
the limitations of the process, Duke admitted, for 19% of the issues
raised, it did not believe that the issue would get resolved as part
of the stakeholder process.155 Examples given of the 19% that Duke
didn’t expect to be resolved include more stable lake levels, limiting
lake drawdowns, guaranteeing water quantity or quality, banning
or capping inter-basin transfers, adding buffers to the area
regulated by the FERC license, dredging, and large-scale land
conservation.156 Moreover, for the majority of issues raised—40%—
Duke indicated that it was willing to continue negotiating around

152. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 16
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0564; See also infra Appendix.
153. Application for New License regarding Catawba-Wateree Project, P-2232–522,
Submittal 20060927-0564 at 16 (FERC Aug. 29, 2006); See infra Appendix.
154. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 71–73
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0554; See also infra Appendix.
155.

Id.

156.

Id.
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the suggested changes.157 Examples of this group that could still be
negotiated include downstream flow warning horns, permanent
conservation easements, cultural resource improvements, land
conservation, a “better balance of flows vs. lake levels vs.
generation vs. water supplies,” and modifying or replacing hydro
units to meet flow and dissolved oxygen requirements.158
After making changes, another poll was taken to determine if
clarifications and changes made to the draft had resulted in more
favorable feelings from stakeholders.159 The results were similar;
out of forty-one participants in the assessment, thirteen (again,
almost 32%) still ranked the draft document a five.160 An additional
sixteen, or 39%, ranked it a four.161 The revisions, then, had led to
basically no change in stakeholder sentiment.
While these assessments were done anonymously, making it
impossible to tell how those of different stakeholder groups ranked
the draft document, the anonymity obviously changed once the
agreement was finalized, which occurred in two steps.162 First, all
stakeholders were asked—using the same five point scale—to rate
the finalized agreement.163 This agreement in principle (“AIP”) was
not legally binding, but would be used to develop the
Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement (“CRA”), which would be
157.

Id.

158. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 71–73
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0594; see infra Appendix.
159. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 36 (P2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0552; See infra Appendix.
160.

Id.

161.

Id.

162.

Id.

163. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 100–02
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0553; See infra Appendix.
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submitted to the FERC and would be binding.164 Second,
stakeholders were asked to sign the binding CRA. Therefore, the
other measure used to analyze this relicensing is whether
organizations or individuals who had participated in the process
did not, in the end, sign on to the finalized agreement.165 This
analysis is completed by looking at two metrics: 1) how members
ranked the agreement using the consensus scale at the time the
AIP was complete; and 2) which groups did not sign onto the CRA
when it was submitted to the FERC.
1. How Team Members Ranked the Agreement using the
Consensus Scale
Out of a total possible 103 signatures for the AIP in April,
2006,166 only three parties ranked it a five, meaning that they
would not be willing to sign on, even listing major reservations.167
All three fell into the “others” category above: American Rivers, the
South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, and a local citizen.168
The largest group—at forty-five out of 103, or almost 44%—ranked
the AIP a four, meaning that they still had major reservations, and
potentially would not sign a legally binding document unless some

164. Some of the conditions in the CRA would be written into the new license, and
would be binding in that way; others would need to be enforced based on state contract law in
the state courts. See Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at
46 (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0546.
165. Application for a New License Regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project, P-2232522, Submittal 20060927-0155 at E1–25 (FERC Aug. 29, 2006).
166. The negotiations continued between October, 2005, and April, 2006. In February,
2006, both the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and American Rivers jointly proposed a different
flow regime, specifically aimed to address fish. Duke rejected the proposal, arguing that the
“additional hydro generation impacts exceed what Duke can support.” Application for a New
License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 27 (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal
20060927-0617.
167. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 100–02
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0553; See also infra Appendix.
168.

Id.
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of their concerns were addressed.169 Of this group, 53% were
officials of state or local governments, including the entire
contingent of the South Carolina Department of Archives and
History, the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, and
the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation, and
Tourism.170 Of the remaining 21, or 47%, all were members of the
“other stakeholder” group. In fact, only fifteen members total of the
“other stakeholder” group ranked the AIP either a one, two, or
three. On the other hand, all Duke employees ranked the draft
assessment as acceptable.171

AIP Level of Consenus by Group
50
40
30
20
10
0
1

2
Duke employees

169.

3
Officials

4

5

Others

Id.

170. Id.; See also infra Appendix (All representatives of South Carolina state
government submitted a ranking, except the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control).
171.

Id.
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After obtaining signatures from those who were willing to sign
on to the AIP, the work began to attempt to address some of the
major concerns and convert the language into that which could be
legally binding.172 However, rather than going smoothly, at least
eleven AIP signatories—including five town or county attorneys—
found it impossible to resolve “all concerns about certain
incomplete or ambiguous provisions in the AIP” on the schedule
that Duke wanted.173 The group also noted that, with the AIP,
“changes that were made after the final negotiation and before
signing materially affected substantive interests, even though
characterized as technical corrections.”174 At the end of the
Stakeholder track process, seventy groups signed on to the
Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement (“CRA”). 175
2. Which Team Members Did Not Sign the CRA
According to a Duke press release, which required expansion
of recreational access and new recreational amenities, this
agreement also scheduled releases of additional water for
recreation, water quality enhancements, a new drought
management protocol, long-range water supply planning for
municipal drinking water systems, additional land conservation,
the expansion of aquatic habitats, the protection of endangered
species, and the preservation of historic and archeological
resources.176 In order to apply this relicensing to the different

172. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project (FERC
2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0546. (Also cited within the discussion of Purpose of
the AIP).
173. Application for a New License regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project at 91
(FERC 2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060927-0554.
174.

Id. at 91–92.

175.

Id.

176. Press Release, Duke Energy, Duke Energy's new Catawba-Wateree operating
license highlights the benefits of cooperation between the company and communities (Nov. 25,
2015) (on file with author).
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regulation theories, it is necessary to focus on which individuals
and entities did not sign: one state agency, one town, four citizens,
and seven environmental groups.177
After the signing of the CRA, Duke Energy submitted the
application for relicensing on August 29, 2006. Duke Energy also
filed a revised CRA which removed the signature lines for the
individuals and entities that chose not to adopt the CRA, as well
as removing any actions which had been contingent upon those
individuals or entities signing.178 The FERC would not complete
the necessary environmental analysis and issue a license renewal
for nine years.179

177. The state agency was the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control. The Town was the Town of Cornelius. The environmental groups
were American Rivers, the Catawba Riverkeeper Foundation, Clean Water South Carolina,
Covekeepers, the Lake James Environmental Groups, the South Carolina Coastal
Conservation League, and the Western North Carolina Alliance. Revised Comprehensive
Relicensing Agreement and Explanatory Statement with respect to the Application for New
License for the Catawba-Wateree Hydroelectric Project at 23–43 (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522),
Submittal 20070118-0228. This listing of the parties was modified to remove signature lines
for those entities and individuals who elected not to become parties. Revised Comprehensive
Relicensing Agreement and Explanatory Statement with respect to the Application for New
License for the Catawba-Wateree Hydroelectric Project at 1 (FERC 2006) (P-2232-522),
Submittal 20070118-0227 [hereinafter Revised CRA, Submittal 20070118-0227]; See also
DUKE ENERGY, C-W Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement, app. B, (2016), https://www.dukeenergy.com/pdfs/C-W-CRA-APPENDIX-B.pdf (not listing the Town of Cornelius or these
environmental groups as parties); Catawba Relicensing (SC), AMERICAN WHITEWATER,
https://www.americanwhitewater.org/content/Project/view/id/27/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
178.

See Revised CRA, Submittal 20070118-0227, supra note 177.

179. Draft Environmental Impact Statement was issued on March 6, 2009. See Draft
Envtl. Impact Statement for Hydropower License regarding the Catawba-Wateree
Hydroelectric Project (FERC 2009) (P-2232-522), Issuance 20090306-4000. The final EIS was
issued on July 23, 2009. See Final Envtl. Impact Statement for Hydropower License regarding
the Catawba-Wateree Hydroelectric Project (FERC 2009) (P-2232-522), Issuance 200907234001. Formal consultation on the Endangered Species Act followed. See U.S. NOAA Response
to U.S. FERC’s Request for Formal Consultation of Catawba-Wateree Project under Section 7
of the Endangered Species Act (FERC 2009) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20090910-0237. A final
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During that time, the majority of the groups which had not
signed onto the CRA did engage with the FERC in the relicensing,
advocating for conditions which had not been implemented in the
CRA.180 The Town of Cornelius submitted extensive comments and
objections to the FERC, especially around recreational
opportunities, safety, and funding.181 American Rivers,182 the
South Carolina Coastal Conservation League,183 and Catawba
Riverkeeper184 focused on minimum instream flows, inadequate
mitigation, and flow protocols for diadromous fish, while the Lake
James Environmental Association advocated for adding usable
water storage to Lake Norman.185

biological opinion was issued on July 8, 2013. See The Catawba-Wateree Hydroelectric Project,
Final Biological Opinion (FERC 2013) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20130708-4003.
180. Clean Water South Carolina, Covekeepers, and the Western North Carolina
Alliance did not submit comments to the FERC.
181. See Town of Cornelius’ Comments for the Catawba-Wateree Hydro Project
(FERC 2008) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20061030-5083; See also Town of Cornelius’ Comments
and Recommendations in Response to Notice of Application Ready for Environmental Analysis
(FERC 2008) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20080606-5033.
182. See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League and American Rivers, et al.,
Notice of Intervention Offering Protest and Comments (FERC 2007) (P-2232-522), Submittal
20070105-5029 (flow protocols for diadromous fish) [hereinafter American Rivers, Submittal
20070105-5029]; See also South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, et al., Notice of Intent
to Prepare an EIS and Soliciting Comments for the Catawba Wateree Hydroelectric Project
(FERC 2007) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20070430-5198 (out of kind mitigation, minimum
instream flows, inadequate mitigation) [hereinafter Notice of Intent to Prepare an EIS,
Submittal 20070430-5198. (comments on EA, proposing alternative conditions to be included
in new license).
183. See American Rivers, Submittal 20070105-5029, supra note 182; See also Notice
of Intent to Prepare an EIS, Submittal 20080606-5134.
184. See Catawba Riverkeeper Found., Comments and Recommendations Regarding
Notice of License Ready for Environmental Analysis (FERC 2008) (P-2232-522), Submittal
20080711-5097 (inadequate project impact mitigation, continuous stream flows).
185. See Lake James Envtl. Ass’n, Comments on U.S. FERC’s FEIS (FERC 2009) (P2232-522), Submittal 20090828-5025.
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The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control also found the CRA insufficient. After reviewing all
material, the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control denied Duke Energy’s request for a 401
certification, finding:
[T]he Water Quality Certification as issued does not provide
sufficient flow to protect classified uses, the endangered
shortnose sturgeon and adequate downstream flow of the
Catawba River into South Carolina in order to provide
reasonable assurance that certification requirements and
water quality standards in the Catawba River in South
Carolina will be met.186
Litigation on South Carolina’s 401 certification continued
until February 12, 2015, when the South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control issued a 401 certification to
Duke Energy that had been reached through settlement
negotiations.187 The EPA also provided comments on the license

186. See Coastal Conservation League’s and American Rivers’ Response in Opposition
to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC’s Petition for Declaratory Order at 2 (FERC 2009) (P-2232522), Submittal 20090910-5075.
187. See Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Issuance of SC WQ Certification (FERC 2015)
(P-2232-522), Submittal 20150213-5244 (submitting South Carolina certification); Letter from
Julia F. Youngman to Kimbery Bose regarding settlement agreement and 401 water quality
certification (FERC 2015) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20150303-5040 (noting the settlement). The
South Carolina 401 certification and the possibility that South Carolina had waived the
possibility to provide conditions was the subject of litigation. See Winston & Strawn, LLP,
Supplemental Information of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Update on South Carolina Waiver
of Water Quality Certification (FERC 2012) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20121219-5031 (noting
that Duke Energy had lost its appeal in the South Carolina Court of Appeals and that South
Carolina had waived water quality certification); See Southern Envtl. Law Center, Response
to Duke Update on South Carolina Water Quality Certification for the Catawba-Wateree
Hydroelectric Project (FERC 2013) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20130904-5010 (noting that the
South Carolina Court of Appeals reaffirmed the decision that South Carolina had not waived
401 certifications on May 1, 2013); See also Order Denying Petition for Declaratory Order
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application, including a need for higher levels of dissolved
oxygen,188 while the National Marine Fisheries Service requested a
license condition reserving the right to prescribe fishways.189
V. WHAT THE CATAWBA-WATEREE SHOWS ABOUT
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION THEORIES
The FERC granted the Catawba-Wateree project a forty-year
license on November 25, 2015.190 The license term starts the first
day of the month the order granting the new license is issued,191 so
the new license will be good until October, 2055. November 2015
was almost ten years after Duke felt it had, for the most part,
reached consensus on the license terms with many of the
stakeholders.

(FERC 2014) (P-2232-522), Issuance 20140417-3008 (providing a good summary of the 401
certification).
188. See U.S. EPA Region 4, Comments on the EIS for the Catawba-Wateree
Hydroelectric Project at 3 (FERC 2007) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20070501-5049 (continuous
minimum flows, water quality, shoreline management); See also U.S. EPA Region 4,
Comments on the Draft EIS for the Catawba-Wateree Hydroelectric Project (FERC 2009) (P2232-522), Submittal 20090508-5056 (indicating need for increased dissolved oxygen
enhancement, including continuous monitoring, in new license).
189. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce NOAA, Preliminary Recommendations Pursuant to
FPA Section 10(j) and Reservation of Authority to Prescribe Fish Passage (FERC 2008) (P2232-522), Submittal 20080606-5077 (requesting the formation of a drought management
advisory group, supporting instream flows in the CRA, but requesting the license include a
provision for reevaluating and implementing revised instream flows, and reserving the right
to prescribe fishways).
190. See Order Issuing New License, 153 FERC. P62,135 (FERC Nov. 25, 2015).
[hereinafter Order Issuing New License].
191.

Id.
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The new license contains improved environmental conditions
over the original 1958 development:192 increased minimum flows,193
increased recreational flows,194 flow and reservoir elevation
monitoring,195 a flow and water quality implementation plan,196 a
water quality monitoring plan,197 additional recreation
measures,198 federal threatened and endangered species protection

192. Duke admitted during the stakeholder process that “the existing license has very
few requirements” and that Duke “has a lot of control over the release of water.” Application,
Submittal 20060927-0576, supra note 117, at 3.
193. Minimum continuous flow is the minimum amount of water that a hydro
development must normally release continuously. These flow amounts include the
combination of all leakage, spillage, and hydro generation from a given development. See
Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement for the Catawba-Wateree Hydro Project No. 2232, DUKE
ENERGY
CAROLINAS,
LLC.
(Dec.
22,
2006),
http://www.dukeenergy.com/pdfs/relicensing/comp_relicensing_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Comprehensive
Relicensing Agreement].
194. Recreational flow is the scheduled amount of water released from a hydro
development to efficiently support recreational activities at the development. Id.
Interestingly, after the grant of the new license by the FERC, Duke has requested to decrease
the recreational flows agreed upon through the process, cutting the planned releases from
Wylie in half. Application to Amend C-W WQCs – September 9, 2016, https://www.dukeenergy.com/community/lakes/hydroelectric-relicensing/catawba.
195.

See id.; See also Order Issuing New License, supra note 190.

196. See Order Issuing New License, supra at note 190; See also Comprehensive
Relicensing Agreement, supra note 193.
197. See Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement, supra note 193; See also Order
Issuing New License, supra note 190.
198. See Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement, supra note 193; See also Order
Issuing New License, supra note 190.
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plans,199 the development of a low inflow protocol,200 and a shoreline
management plan.201 The FERC license contains many provisions
which are identical to the CRA. Additionally, the settlement with
American Rivers, the South Carolina Coastal Conservation
League, and the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control required that, ten years after the flow and
water quality implementation plan modifications are complete,
Duke Energy “shall consult with the USFWS, the National Marine
Fisheries Service, and the South Carolina Department of Natural
Resources on proposed license articles for Wateree Spring Stable
Flow Periods and Wateree Floodplain Inundation,” with the license
to be modified with the updated conditions.202
Without the benefit of the passage of time, it is impossible to
know whether the requirements of the new license will serve the
public well or not; whether the endangered species will recover
without additional flow; whether adequate drinking water supplies
will be maintained; whether quality of life and economic
opportunities increase because of more recreation. This section
does not attempt to predetermine what will occur, only what could
potentially occur because of the process that was used in the
relicensing effort.
Duke has stated that the “relicensing process has met as wideranging an array of interests as can reasonably be achieved.”203
While on its face just the sheer amount of public participation
would support the civic republicanism theory, the number of
stakeholders with major reservations at the end of the process
belies this conclusion. Also, one of the core tenants of that theory—

199. See Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement, supra note 193; See also Order
Issuing New License, supra note 190.
200. See Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement, supra note 193; See also Order
Issuing New License, supra note 190.
201. See Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement, supra note 193; See also Order
Issuing New License, supra note 190.
202.

See Order Issuing New License, supra note 190.

203.

Collaborative relicensing, supra note 115.
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that the preferences of those participating in regulatory decisionmaking processes ultimately crystallize during the very course of
the decision-making process—obviously did not occur in this case;
instead, some positions were crystallized at the outset and changed
little, if any. Another requirement—that parties settle upon a
decision roughly constituting a consensus about the appropriate
course of regulatory action after having developed that opinion
together—could not occur in this case because Duke was unwilling
to consider cases which were acceptable to others but which would
undermine its profit.204
Additionally, only Duke maintained the right to mandate
specific license conditions as a prerequisite to act in the agreement;
no other party was able to, at any point, require specific license
conditions to have the agreement move forward or take effect.205
The license was issued for a shorter time period than Duke had
requested—forty years instead of fifty.206 The company requested a
rehearing before the FERC, disagreeing with the FERC’s judgment
that Duke’s “moderate” scope of work warranted a forty-year term

204. This is especially true of the flow proposal developed by USFWS and American
Rivers. Stakeholders felt that the flows designed by Duke were insufficient for diadromous
fish or fish passage, and developed an alternative to the “Mutual Gains” scenario that had
been developed by Duke. Stakeholder, Submittal 20060927-0605, supra note 101, at 117. Duke
analyzed the proposal and found that the “proposed flows cause a 10% loss in hydro generation,
compared to a 7% loss in the Mutual Gains Scenario” and that “Duke Power's overall
assessment” was that the proposal had “[a]dditional hydro generation impacts [that] exceed
what Duke can support”. Id. at 118–19. In the “Mutual Gains” scenario, flows for aquatic
habitat had already been reduced. Application for a New License Regarding the CatawbaWateree Project, P-2232-522, Submittal 20060927-0614, 108 (FERC Aug. 29, 2006).
205. In addition to the recreational, land conservation, and other mitigation measures
which were dependent upon Duke obtaining a fifty-year license, Duke employees had noted
that, should the USFWS prescribe different flows for fish, “everything in the Final Agreement
will need to be re-evaluated.” Stakeholder, Submittal 20060927-0605, supra note 118, at 17.
206.

See Order Issuing New License 153 F.E.R.C. P62,134 (F.E.R.C. 2015).
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rather than a fifty-year one. 207 However, the FERC denied the
petition for a longer term, affirming that the moderate level of
“environmental mitigation and enhancement measures . . .
required under the new license” justified a forty-year term.208 For
those who signed the CRA, the shorter license term means that
Duke is under no obligation to implement many of the provisions
agreed to—including providing money to the states for land
conservation and granting easements— as these were all made
contingent on Duke receiving a fifty-year license.209 This
substantial difference in power—that entities and individuals gave
up time to be part of the process and support the agreement, but
may not get the bargained benefits—goes against the process
providing substantial support for the civic republican theory to be
at work in this case. This stance also seems somewhat hypocritical
given that, had the relicensing process gone smoothly after Duke
submitted its application in mid-2006, it is likely that a license
would have been issued in mid-2008. Had a fifty-year license term
been granted then, it would expire in 2058. As it is, Duke has a
license which does not expire until late 2055, and they were not
required to provide the additional resource enhancements or
mitigation activities required by the new license from 2008 to 2015.

207. Bruce Henderson, Duke Energy Wants Longer Catawba License, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER
(Dec.
22,
2015),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article51068350.html.
208. See Order on Rehearing and Clarification, 156 F.E.R.C. P61,010 (F.E.R.C. 2016).
The FERC order opined that fifty-year terms should only be given when “extensive measures”
are required, which they were not in the case of the Catawba-Wateree. Id. The order notes
that “Duke Energy predominantly relies on cost as the basis for supporting a longer license
term. However, our selection of license term is largely based on a qualitative, rather than a
quantitative analysis. While estimated costs can provide some indication of the extent of
required measures, costs alone are never entirely dispositive, especially where, as here, Duke
Energy’s cost data are not reliable.” Id. at 5. Duke has petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals for review. David Boraks, Duke Appeal Seeks Longer License for Catawba-Wateree,
WFAE (Aug. 23, 2016), http://wfae.org/post/duke-appeal-seeks-longer-license-catawbawateree; https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/file_list.asp?accession_num=20160822-5246.
209. Bruce Henderson, supra note 207. While beyond the scope of this article, Duke
also received a forty-year license for its hydro operations on the Yadkin River in North
Carolina. Id. It had also requested a fifty-year term in that docket, which was denied after a
rehearing. Id.
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If wanting to ensure public involvement in the future, not
providing the bargained-for items because of what amounts to a
three-year difference appears to be a good way to ensure that you
won’t get it. There is simply no reason for individual,
environmental, community, local, state, and tribal government
stakeholders to give up hundreds of hours over three years and
then not get promised benefits in return. Performing all bargainedfor benefits—regardless of whether the license term was 30, 40, or
50 years—could go toward encouraging future participation.
It could be argued that perhaps the biggest support for
claiming that the hydropower relicensing process is in the public
interest doesn’t have anything to do with the process itself, but
simply that hydropower will continue to be produced at all. As we
move into a carbon-constrained world, the continuation of the
hydroelectric system means that carbon-free generation will be
produced for the duration of the new license.210 Additionally, once
built, hydropower facilities are relatively cheap to operate and
maintain, as electric generation goes, so there is a benefit to
ratepayers.211 However, this benefit to ratepayers seems to have
occurred with no organized interest in the process: the most logical
groups that would have advocated for this outcome—the state
utility commissions or the public staffs—were not stakeholder
team members. On the other hand, “without careful consideration
and management, dams have the potential to degrade river
ecosystems and the goods and services they provide to society.”212
210. If Duke had either not received a license or disagreed with the license terms so
strongly that they decided to discontinue operations, a surrender process would have started
with the FERC.
211. Interestingly, a Duke representative expressed concern “that the electric
consumer is not specifically represented on any of the stakeholder teams.” Application,
Submittal 20060927-0602, supra note 118, at 147.
212. Jeffrey J. Opperman et al., The Penobscot River, Maine, USA: A Basin-Scale
Approach to Balancing Power Generation and Ecosystem Restoration, 16 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 7
(2011), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss3/art7/main.html.
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Arguably, while the management will improve, Duke stressed at
every opportunity that the “Catawba-Wateree region was not a
pristine landscape when the first hydroelectric stations were
constructed . . . The region had suffered considerable
environmental impacts from poor land management practices
dating back to the arrival of European colonists.”213 Based on the
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
plus seven environmental groups and four citizens thinking the
CRA fell so far short that they would not sign it, it seems unlikely
that the process resulted in “careful consideration and
management” going forward; but only time will tell.
Even the potential general benefit of continued hydropower
production, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the public
interest theory best describes the overall relicensing process. While
some of the license conditions will no doubt reflect improvements
that are in the public interest (including increased stream flows for
endangered species, new protocols for drinking water supply, and
increased recreation opportunities), there does not seem to be any
indication that the general public—even in the area where the
Catawba-Wateree licensing was taking place—are “especially
cognizant” of the regulatory action, or are providing much
regulatory oversight. Nor does it seem that a “republican moment”
occurred at any time during the relicensing; no specific event or
action prompted widespread public interest in either the process or
the outcome.
Because the public interest theory espouses the view that
regulation protects the public from monopolies, the abuse of
private economic power, and the effects of externalities, the
question when assessing the Catawba-Wateree relicensing process
against this theory then becomes the extent to which the general
interests of the citizens of North and South Carolina were, in fact,
protected from these things during the relicensing process. While
inherently a subjective assessment, the best measure is perhaps
how many public officials as well as other entities and individuals
were unhappy with the outcome of the process, with a majority of
all those involved in the process either rejecting the AIP outright
or indicating major reservations. Even after “substantive” edits
made after negotiations were final apparently placated the
213.

Application, Submittal 20060927-0155, supra note 101, at ES-1.
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majority of officials, over half of the individual citizens who
participated in the process chose not to sign the CRA. Additionally,
the significant number of environmental groups who also chose not
to sign the CRA indicates that it is unlikely that the process
protected interests from the effects of the abuse of private economic
power by a monopoly. As one citizen put it in a letter to the FERC:
In the beginning, Duke Power hired the facilitators,
collected the stakeholders, then squashed the air out of the
process by sitting down at the table as a stakeholder . . .
Then Duke collected the interest of stakeholders and
themselves, picked and headed the studies, and set the
agendas. Now with total control and all the interest out on
the table, Duke started picking and choosing the interest
they would meet. Duke’s interest had little to do with what
is best for the river basin, but only wanted the most
signatures for the least amount of money.214
As some of the externalities of producing hydropower—
including on endangered fish populations—are being only
somewhat mitigated, the process seems to fail the public interest
theory test on this measure as well. Even those who, in the end,
supported the agreement, did not feel especially good about it. One
small business owner who was a member of an advisory group
stated:
Five items actually escaped my desires that I felt would be
highly beneficial to the public. I am not going to rehash
those items. I felt like . . . as part of the process, they were
compromised . . . I did not get paid for my attendance to the

214. Application for a New License Regarding the Catawba-Wateree Project (FERC
2006) (P-2232-522), Submittal 20060918-5001.
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three years of meetings. Instead, it cost me in time and lost
income.215
Certainly not a resounding endorsement.
Based on the empirical measures analyzed, it would seem that
the public choice theory does describe best what happened in this
particular hydropower relicensing.216 This “enhanced” process,
while appearing to support broad public participation, may or may
not—again, time will tell—have ended with better outcomes for the
public. Certainly, some involved in the process did not feel that the
outcome of the process was in the public interest. In fact, the NEPA
process and litigation over some of the issues raised originally in
the teams was one reason the license took so long to issue. There
is plenty in this relicensing process to support the notion that
agencies deliver regulatory benefits to well organized political
interest groups, which profit at the expense of the general,
unorganized public. That includes the requests of many of those
who took part in the “enhanced” process, including requests for
better flood control, flows to enhance habitat for endangered fish,
more land conservation (especially as this would also protect water
quality for drinking water supply), and infrastructure
improvements. Additionally, the long license term—whether for
forty years or fifty—validates that, once some regulatory decisions
are made, they are very rarely revisited. The entire stakeholder
process appeared designed—given the exorbitant number of
meetings—to be primarily to wear other stakeholders down.
However, given everything that occurred in this relicensing
process, perhaps the other question—for later discussion when the
environmental, economic, and regulatory outcomes of the
operation of the license is better known—is whether any process
would be successful in ensuring the common good, or whether any
attempt at engaging stakeholders in this space is simply a charade
in terms of legitimacy.

215. Transcript of the 3/26/07 Scoping Meeting Held in Morgantown, NC at the
Western Piedmont Community College re: Catawba-Wateree Relicensing Project 16 (FERC
2007) (P-2232-522), Issuance 20070326-4037.
216. And could be happening in others; Duke alone has eight hydroelectric relicensing
processes occurring in the Carolinas and Indiana. Relicensing Agreements, supra note 103.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This case study will hopefully provide insights into how—if a
company or organization really wants it—to better encourage
public participation in a similar process. This potential for
improvement is especially important because the problem of
protecting somewhat diffuse public interests doesn’t only exist
with the FERC relicensing process and hydroelectric dams owned
and operated by investor-owned utilities; parallels exist between
private investor-owned utility hydropower systems and reservoir
and hydropower systems managed by the Army Corps of
Engineers. Many similar issues around the impact of organized
interests exist with the multiple-use paradigms used by the ACOE
in managing their reservoirs, as “[c]oncentrated groups tend to fare
well, or at least enjoy a significant advantage, under multiple-use
governance.”217 Additionally, some similar problems with potential
environmental harms also exist between Corps dam projects and
investor-owned utility operated hydropower projects. Even with
these challenges, more public participation in energy regulation
can only be a good thing.
APPENDIX
I. Data Sources
The attendance data is provided in a series of tables in the
relicensing docket (Book 10, Volume 1, Part 1). The tables, sorted
by team, list the dates of team meetings along the top and
individual team members’ names down the side. An “X” is placed
in the appropriate row/column for each person who attended a
specific meeting. One table exists for each team for each year of the
relicensing effort: 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. These all occur in P2232-522, Submittal 20060927-0545.

217. Josh Eagle, supra note 17, at 47; See also Victor B. Flatt & Jeremy M. Tarr,
Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: Managing Water Supply
in A Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499 (2011).
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The two anonymous AIP assessment results are provided in
the relicensing docket in meeting minutes. The assessment results
provide how those scoring the AIP draft responded, both to the
overall draft (the numbers used in this article), as well as how
those responded scored individual sections of the AIP. These occur
in P-2232-522, Submittal 20060927-0552 and 20060927-0564.
The AIP Distribution Categorization document, which lists all
the organizations and individuals involved, is also included in
meeting minutes. The document lists the level of consensus of the
finalized AIP by organization/individual, and also summarizes the
totals for each rating. This document is in P-2232-522, Submittal
20060927-0553.
These
documents
can
be
found
at
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clear/publications/longslogapp
endix.pdf.
II. Methodology
To analyze attendance, I first assigned each member of each
team to a particular group: 1) Duke employee; 2) officials, including
those of federal agencies, Indian tribes, state agencies, towns,
counties, local authorities or commissions; and 3) others, which
included citizens, large businesses, small businesses,
homeowners’s associations, environmental and recreational
groups, and wildlife groups. After assigning the group, I counted
attendance by all members of that group for a particular team for
the entire duration of the relicensing process, and divided that by
the number of people times the number of meetings to obtain the
percentages of attendance for each group within each team.
The analysis of the AIP assessment results is purely based on
the numbers provided in the documents; number who gave the AIP
a particular score divided by the total number of responses.
The AIP Distribution was calculated similar to the
attendance. After each organization/individual was assigned to
their particular group (the same as used for attendance), the
number who gave the AIP each level of consensus was determined.

